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ABSTRACT
What are the narrative possibilities for understanding nonprofit law? Given
the porous barriers between nonprofit law and the literature about it, there
are many. Here I consider two. First, nonprofit law and nonprofit literature
are each enriched and made fully explicable by reference to the other. Non-
profit law has grown in parallel with literature. It may even be that impor-
tant legal texts, texts about doing and being good, were imported directly
from literary sources into law. Second, in writings ranging from sensational
journalism to high literature, nonprofit laws and the scandals involving their
violations have captured the public imagination for centuries. That nonprof-
it law deals with human concerns such as faithfulness and the struggle to do
good also makes nonprofit literature effective in creating the rich back-
ground against which the law can be better understood.
* Louis and Myrtle Moskowitz Research Professor of Business and Law, Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School, and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic
Research. Many thanks to Aimee Mangan Bacik and the University of Michigan Law Li-
brary for research assistance, and to Lia Ernst, Don Herzog, Mae Kuykendall, Bill Miller,
Cara Robertson, Bill Novak, and James Boyd White for helpful comments and conversa-
tions.
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INTRODUCTION
It often strikes me as funny when my students report that they plan to
"work at a nonprofit." You might think that students seeking public interest
jobs would understand that the word "nonprofit" is a somewhat imprecise
legal term referring to a type of corporation or trust. After all, law students
study legal forms. Future venture capitalists do not proclaim, "I want to
work for a limited liability partnership." They say, "I want to work in ven-
ture capital." Law students who want to work at big firms don't articulate
their dreams by declaring, "When I graduate I will form a professional cor-
poration and affiliate with a legal partnership." They say, "I want to liti-
gate," or "I'm interested in intellectual property."
I'm often tempted to respond to these students by asking, "Really?
Any nonprofit? Handgun Control, Inc.? The National Rifle Association?
The Massachusetts General Hospital? The Grosse Pointe Yacht Club? The
NFL? The Cato Institute? Or, perhaps, the ACLU?" But I don't. That
kind of sarcasm can be mean. And I know that these students don't want to
tell me that they intend to work for a charitable corporation (or trust) ex-
empt from taxation under §501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Nor do they
wish to convey their passion for gainful employment at an organization
"that is precluded, by external regulation or its own governance structure,
from distributing its financial surplus to those who control the use of orga-
nizational assets."' At some level, I understand what these students mean to
say. They want to work for the public good.
Students are not the only ones who have difficulty articulating what
they mean by the term "nonprofit." Legal scholars have similar trouble. So
much so that a good deal of the action in charities scholarship involves iden-
tifying and defining the nonprofit species.2 (This is not only a problem for
legal scholars; economists have spent many decades struggling to identify
the nonprofit firm's objective function.)' Luckily, even without precise
definitions, we are able to form nonprofits and work productively through
them to achieve publicly spirited ends. Maybe this is because nonprofit law
is informed by, perhaps sustained by, extra-legal sources. Maybe stories
about nonprofits, formal and otherwise, provide a backdrop against which
1. Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK I (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (citing
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980)).
2. See generally, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 1; Michael C. Hone, Aristotle and
Lyndon Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking at Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corpora-
tions - The American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 39 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 751 (1988-89).
3. See Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, What Do Nonprofits Maximize? Nonprofit
Hospital Service Provision and Market Ownership Mix (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13246, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3246.
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we can better understand and interpret the law. As Robert Cover explains, a
legal "tradition includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a
mythos-narratives in which the corpus juris is located by those whose
wills act upon it." And, as I explain below, not only do stories support the
law, but sometimes the law supports the stories.
Legal scholars have documented the many interactions between law
and literature.' They explain how stories about law advance law, undermine
justice, reinforce social roles, and capture the public imagination through
fictionalized accounts of legal events. However, according to Professor
Mae Kuykendall, the identification of literary aspects of law and the use of
narrative techniques in its analysis have "claimed ground in some fields of
law, such as criminal law and the legal treatment of minorities," but have
not been employed in other fields such as business law.6 Moreover, judges
have not successfully used narratives as part of their analytic or persuasive
arsenal in deciding corporate cases, and stories are not typically used to
make corporate law socially comprehensible.' Kuykendall further explains
that the dearth of narrative approaches in business law scholarship results
not from some terrible oversight on the part of legal scholars but rather be-
cause the law of corporations is not a fruitful subject for narrative: "Corpo-
rate law is abstract, because its subject is not readily reducible to human
stories."'
In inviting me to speak at the Michigan State University College of
Law's Symposium on Business Law and Narrative, Professor Kuykendall
asked me to consider whether the law related to charitable corporations is
similarly story-proof or whether it is more amenable to narrative techniques
than she finds corporate law. I'm not sure that I agree with the premise
about the mismatch between business law and narrative. And even if Pro-
fessor Kuykendall's conclusions were once accurate, I am skeptical that
they describe the state of corporate law and the possibilities for its analysis
in this new era in which inadequate regulation is widely seen as a cause of
corporate failures and the harm they cause.
Regardless of whether business law is a suitable subject for the me-
thods of law and literature, the short answer to her question of whether non-
4. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narr-
ative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 9 (1983). See also James Boyd White, Law as Language: Read-
ing Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415 (1982).
5. For a long list of the ways in which law and literature are related, ranging from
the uses of "legal fictions" in legal writing to the role of law in fiction, see the introduction to
RIcHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LIrERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 1-21 (1988).
6. Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role ofNarrative in Corporate
Law, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 537, 538 (2007).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 541.
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profit law lacks narrative materials is, "no way." In studying nonprofit law'
-particularly, but not only, case law-one is often confronted with stories
of people trying to do good, to be true custodians of charitable purposes,
and to find their way into heaven. There are images and stories everywhere
you look.
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to demonstrate that nonprofit law
can and does employ similar narrative techniques as do other areas of law,
such as criminal law, that more obviously rely on rich narratives about cru-
cial events or the parties' characters. But it wouldn't be hard to make the
case. Consider, for one, the 1954 opinion in which the California Court of
Appeals forgave George Pepperdine his likely breach of fiduciary duties
because his motives were pure. There the court first equated the Pepperdine
Foundation with the man himself and then excused any breach, even one
due to "a breakdown of his intellectual powers or a transmutation of his
intelligence in his new world of disbursing charity."'o The characterization
of Pepperdine as a man of uncommon generosity drove the decision, per-
haps at the expense of legal doctrine." At another time, another judge
might not have focused on Pepperdine's personal story of hard work and
generosity but rather on the costs of Pepperdine's behavior for the founda-
tion's objects.' 2
Moreover, to understand a nonprofit's mission requires a story with at
least a few sentences of text. This is one reason why the Internal Revenue
Service recently redesigned the Form 990, the annual information return
that nonprofits must file with the Service. The new form includes space for
9. Nonprofit law is not a single body of law. It comes from various sources of law
and all levels of government including the common law of trusts and property, federal and
state tax law, state business and nonprofit codes, and formal and informal powers held by
state attorneys general. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith's comprehensive work on nonprofits,
Marion R. Fremont-Smith, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW AND REGULATION (2004). For a brief summary of these laws, see Jill R. Horwitz, Why
We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals,
50 UCLA L. REv. 1345 (2003).
10. George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600, 604 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954).
11. Fremont-Smith, supra note 9, at 200 (noting that courts typically require a high-
er standard of care in fiduciary duty cases than employed in this case, but that some observ-
ers argue that publicly-spirited citizens who serve without compensation should not be held
to high fiduciary standards).
12. Like the examples Martha Minow uses in Stories in Law, the Pepperdine case
can be retold in a way that demonstrates how stories in the common law are like stories in
literature. According to Minow, storytelling "dwells on particulars while eliciting a point
that itself may be molded or recast in light of the story's particulars reviewed in a different
time." Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE
LAW 24, 25 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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text regarding the organization's mission and activities.13 Nonprofits can't
characterize their work by checking a box, nor can the Service determine
whether the work merits tax exemption by tallying check marks. If you
need more examples of nonprofit narratives in the legal and popular world
ask yourself why there is so much talk about the importance to nonprofit
institutions of retaining their reputations for good character. Of course,
nonprofits, like for-profits which must attract and retain customers, have to
remain in good standing with donors and regulators-but I think there is
more than an instrumental concern underlying the legal and popular dis-
course regarding nonprofits doing good. If we thought of nonprofits as
merely a nexus of contracts and their behavior as instrumental, there would
not be so much worry about the tarnishing of the nonprofit halo. 4 It is pre-
cisely because we have an understanding of what it means to be a nonprofit
that the scandals are so damaging, and why it is so important for nonprofits
to be able to tell a story about their goodness.
However, as I said, my goals in this Essay are more literal and less
ambitious than comprehensively analyzing the use of narrative in charities
law. I hope only to make two observations about nonprofit law and its narr-
ative possibilities. First, the barriers between nonprofit law and literature
are porous, and each is enriched and made fully explicable by reference to
the other. The law has, at least, grown in parallel with literature and it is
possible that an important legal text may have been copied directly from a
literary source. Even the internal revenue code sections regarding the in-
come tax exemption for charities-law that would seem to be about as di-
vorced from literature as possible-have a history in poetry. The discourse
of nonprofit organizations and their laws is not remotely limited to the lan-
guage of corporate organization. It reflects our most serious inquiries into
what it means to do good and be good.
Second, the law of nonprofits and scandals involving legal violations
are nothing like Professor Kuykendall's description of analogous corporate
law stories. They are not "filled with boring details about finance and dom-
inated by the figure of money, a subject of endless fascination and desire,
13. See I.R.S. Form No. 990 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
f990.pdf.
14. For example, Professor Darryll Jones commented that the use of professional
fundraisers and their high fees cause "'erosion of the nonprofit halo' because of an 'almost
prostituting of a nonprofit's name."' Miark Hrywna, 10 Years Later: UCC Case Changed
Fundraising Contracts, NONPROFIT TIMES, July 1, 2009, at 1, 4; see also Evelyn Brody,
Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit
Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457, 460, 492 (1996) (noting that the non-
profit form comes with a halo); Evelyn Brody, Hocking the Halo: Implications of the Chari-
ties' Winning Briefs in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 27 STETSON L. REv. 433 passim
(1997) (discussing the tension between the notion of nonprofits as selfless service providers
and nonprofits as profit-oriented businesses).
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yet invariably seen as a nonstarter for a good read."" Considering the list of
famous literary works about crime, particularly violent crime, and trials, one
might be tempted to think that criminal law is a uniquely suitable legal sub-
ject for fiction."6 But this is not so. Nonprofit scandals, including those
based upon somewhat technical violations of the law, have captured the
public imagination. These scandals have attracted sensationalist journalists
as well as more serious writers. Nonprofit law makes for a page-turner.
And those attributes that make it a good read-for example, that it deals
with deeply human concerns such as faithfulness and the struggle to do
good-also make nonprofit literature effective in creating the rich back-
ground against which the law can be better understood.
Before I go any further, I want to offer a preliminary note. There are
many uses of the term "narrative" in the law and literature scholarship.
Here I gesture towards the most basic of the ideas. I ask whether there is a
story (or stories) to be told in nonprofit law: Are there characters? A se-
quence of events? Narrators? A point of view? Is anything happening?"
In this Essay, I offer first an example of the centrality of literature in chari-
ties law, and then an example of a very good work of fiction based on chari-
ties law. In doing so, I am not employing narrative techniques for the pur-
poses to which they are commonly used, such as unearthing suppressed
narratives to advance justice or "as an antidote to the sterile technicality of
the social sciences," or using fictionalized accounts to critique the law.'I
My project is largely empirical. I find literary language in the law of
nonprofits, sometimes in the very text of the law. And I identify nonprofit
law as central to the plot of a famous novel. These observations about the
connections between nonprofit law and literature may help us understand
how nonprofit law has lasted so long in such incomplete and imprecise
form. And the example of law in literature I discuss below addresses non-
profit law with such skill that it brings to life the subtleties of the law and,
importantly, its unavoidable costs to human flourishing that a reading of
statutes or cases might not highlight.
In the first Part of the Essay, I focus on literature in law. I discuss
William Langland's fourteenth century poem Vision of Piers Plowman and
its links to nonprofit charities law. As has been noted by charities scholars,
15. Kuykendall, supra note 6, at 539.
16. Posner lists several classic legal novels, including A Passage to India, To Kill a
Mockingbird, and The Brothers Karamazov. POSNER, supra note 5, at 6.
17. For an extensive discussion of the multiple meanings of the term "narrative," see
H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE (2d ed. 2008).
18. Julie Stone Peters, Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the Future ofan




the poem is strikingly similar to the Statute of Elizabeth's Preamble."
Whether the poem is a direct source of the Preamble or merely a striking
parallel to it, the connection suggests an untapped possibility for narrative
techniques in nonprofit law. The use of literary sources in this body of law
and in its interpretation may serve a significant function in creating a rich
understanding of charities despite the relatively undeveloped nature of the
doctrine. In Part II, I shift to law in literature. I offer the prominent, and
also much-discussed, example of Anthony Trollope's The Warden. That
Trollope lifted the outlines of his story from contemporary charities cases
suggests that this area of law is ripe for narrative approaches to understand-
ing the law and that nonprofit law can serve as a source for engrossing lite-
rature.
By the end of the Essay I hope to show that my students might be on
to something. Despite their imprecision, their words are made comprehens-
ible by reference to a rich background understanding of nonprofits and non-
profit law, some of which comes from the interplay of law and literature as
well as popular discourse. In other words, we can fill in their legal talk with
cultural knowledge, including literary knowledge. This may well be just
how nonprofit law operates. At least I hope to show that nonprofit law
makes for a great read.
I. LITERATURE IN NONPROFIT LAW: THE VISION OF PIERS PLO WMAN, THE
STATUTE OF ELIZABETH, AND AMERICAN CHARITIES LAW
This Essay is not the place for a thoroughgoing review of the law of
charities which, in recognizable form, dates to first century Rome and pos-
sibly ancient Egypt.2 o Nor-unfortunately, since it is a fascinating story-is
this the place for a review of the struggle between Henry VIII and the
Church over the property rights of charitable corporations. At the time, the
Church's charitable corporations held "an estimated one-third to as much as
one-half of the entire wealth of England."2 1 Talk about theater. Obviously a
detailed review of the mortmain statutes and all the drama that history en-
tailed is too much for a short essay on nonprofits and narrative. But you
should not be deceived into thinking that stories in charities law, replete
with villains and heroes, are a recent phenomenon.
19. See, e.g., James J. Fishman, The Political Use of Private Benevolence: The
Statute of Charitable Uses 44-48 (Pace Law Faculty Publications, Paper No. 487, 2008),
available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1486&context-
lawfaculty (discussing the poem and its connection with the statute).
20. Fremont-Smith, supra note 9, at 3.
21. Id. at 23 (citing William A. Orton, Endowments and Foundations, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 531 (1931)).
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As a reminder of how far back the link between narrative and nonprof-
its goes, I'll begin at the common starting point for charities law scholars,
1601, with the Statute of Charitable Uses (also known as the Statute of Eliz-
abeth). In addition to being the convention among charities lawyers, start-
ing here makes sense for my purposes. The Preamble to the Statute of Eliz-
abeth, which enumerates several charitable purposes, both (1) shaped the
range of acceptable charitable purposes in later English and American law
and (2) closely resembles a famous fourteenth century poem.
A. The Statute of Elizabeth and Piers Plowman
The Statute of Elizabeth, "An Acte to redresse the Misemployment of
Landes Goodes and Stockes of Money heretofore given to Charitable Uses,"
was intended to clean up misuse of charitable assets and provided for the
appointment of a charities commission.22  It begins with a Preamble that
includes the following list of charitable purposes:
relief of aged, impotent and poor people, for maintenance of sick and maimed sol-
diers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities;
for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways;
for education and preferment of orphans; for or towards relief stock or maintenance
for house of correction; for marriage of poor maids; for supportation aid and help
of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed; for relief or redemption
of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning
payment of fifteens, setting out soldiers, and other taxes.23
As several scholars have previously noted, this list is remarkably similar to
one found in William Langland's fourteenth century poem Vision of Piers
Plowman, in which Truth advises rich merchants about the path to salva-
tion:
Merchants to the good had many years,
But none a poena et a culpa would the pope them grant,
For they hold not her holy days as Holy Church teacheth,
And they swear 'by their souls' and 'so God must them help'
Clean against conscience merchandise to sell.
But under his secret seal Truth sent them a letter
That they should buy boldly what they liked best,
And afterwards sell again and save their profits
Therewith to amend maisons Dieu and miserable folk help;
22. Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601) (Eng.).
23. Id.; Joseph Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Pres, 8 HARv. L. REv. 69,
69-70 (1894) (providing a modern translation of the Statute of Elizabeth's Preamble). The
act was first passed in 1597 (39 Eliz. 1, c. 6), but the later act, which includes "unimportant
amendments," is typically cited. W.K. JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY IN ENGLAND 1480-1660: A
STUDY OF THE CHANGING PATTERN OF ENGLISH SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS 112 (1959). For a dis-
cussion of the differences between the two statutes, see E.M. LEONARD, THE EARLY HISTORY
OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF 134-36 (1900).
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To repair rotten roads where plainly required;
And to build up bridges that were broken down;
Help maidens to marry or make of them nuns;
Poor people and prisoners to find them their food;
And set scholars to school or to some other craft;
Relieve poor religious and lower their rents --
'And I shall send you myself Michael mine archangel,
That no devil shall you daunt nor flight you at death, . . . .24
As in the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, drafted well over two
hundred years after the poem, relieving suffering, repairing public infra-
structure, getting food to the poor and to prisoners, and supporting scholars
all count as doing good. As was fitting of the time, religious purposes were
somewhat limited. Joseph Willard explained in an 1894 article in the Har-
vard Law Review:
the "releve religion" of the poem is narrowed in the act to the "repair of churches;"
and the "marien maydenes, or maken hem nonnes" is shorn of the latter clause by
the Protestant legislature of the daughter of Tudor King Harry; as indeed it would
24. WILLIAM LANGLAND, THE BOOK CONCERNING PIERS PLOWMAN (Rachel Attwater
ed., Donald Attwater & Rachel Attwater trans., 1957), available at
http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/-chaucer/special/authors/langland/pp-pass7.html (pro-
viding a translation of The Vision of Piers Plowman, known as the B-text version). The
original reads:
Ac under his secret seel Truthe sente hem a lettre,
[And bad hem] buggen boldely what hem best liked
And sithenes selle it ayein and save the wynnyng,
And amende mesondieux thermyd and myseise folk helpe;
And wikkede weyes wightly amende,
And do boote to brugges that tobroke were;
Marien maydenes or maken hem nonnes;
Povere peple and prisons fynden hem hir foode,
And sette soolers to scole or to som othere craftes;
Releve Religion and renten hem bettre.
"And I shal sende yow myselve Seynt Michel myn angel,
That no devel shal yow dere ne [in youre deying fere yow],
And witen yow fro wanhope, if ye wol thus werche,
And sende youre soules in saufte to my Seintes in joye.'
WILLIAM LANGLAND, THE VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN, Passus 7, available at
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgilt/text/text-idx?c=cme;idno=PPILan;rgn=divl;view-text;cc=
cme;node=PPILan%3A8 (last visited June 15, 2010). This passage appears in both the A-
and C-text versions. WILLIAM LANGLAND, THE VISION OF WILLIAM CONCERNING PIERS THE
PLOWMAN IN THREE PARALLEL TEXTS TOGETHER WITH RICHARD THE REDELESS 228-29 (Rev.
Walter W. Skeat ed., 1886) (reproducing the relevant passages from all three texts: A-text,
Passus VIII, 20-32; B-text, Passus VII, 18-39; C-text Passus X, 22-44). The passage also
appears in Derek Pearsall's recent C-text translation. WILLIAM LANGLAND, PIERS PLOWMAN:
A NEW ANNOTATED EDITION OF THE C-TEXT Passus IX, 27-41 (Derek Pearsall ed., 2008)
[hereinafter PEARSALL].
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hardly have become them to have treated that as a charity which her father had re-
garded as treason, or to have peopled the convents which he had broken up.2 5
The absence of religious purposes in the Preamble did not mean that
religious uses could not be charitable uses during the seventeenth century.
Although commonly referred to as a comprehensive list, the Preamble was
not meant to define all acceptable charitable purposes. Rather, at least at the
time it was drafted, the Preamble defined those uses "deemed to be within
the equity of the statute" and to be enforced by the charity commissioners.2 6
Those wishing to establish trusts for religious purposes needed to "proceed
by simple bill or, in later years, by information."" Later, however, the
courts relied more heavily on the Preamble, concluding that "'the limits
assigned to the statute of Elizabeth are sufficiently extensive to take in al-
most every act, purpose, or object which can be considered as having any
legitimate connection with charity.' 28
The link between the poem and the law is unsettled. Some scholars
believe that the law was derived directly from the poem, which, if true,
would be a striking example of literature as law. Willard, for example,
found "an enumeration of charitable objects so full and so closely similar to
that of the act, that it seems as if the Protestant Parliament of Elizabeth had
borrowed the great church-reforming poet's verses for the staple of their
enactment."29 James Fishman envisions a different route between the poem
and the Preamble, reporting that "[t]he poem was an important part of radi-
cal Reformation literature," and was used for contemporary political pur-
poses in the sixteenth century.30 Fishman further suggests that although the
manuscript of the poem had circulated since Langland wrote it in the four-
teenth century, it makes sense that the poem was ripe for use in the sixteenth
century because it was only published in book form in 1550." And it may
25. Willard, supra note 23, at 71.
26. GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827 120 (1969).
27. Id. at 58.
28. Id. at 133 (citing W.R.A. BOYLE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CHARITIES (London 1857)). See also JEAN WARBURTON, TUDOR ON CHARITIES 3 (9th ed.
2003) (explaining that although it was not intended to do so, "the preamble has had a limiting
effect because the judges have not felt it open to them to hold purposes charitable unless they
could fairly be said to be within the spirit and intendment of the preamble" (citing Morice v.
Bishop of Durham, (1804) 9 Ves. 399, 405, per Sir William Grant M.R.; Williams' Trustees
v. IRC, [1947] A.C. 447, 455,per Lord Simonds)).
29. Willard, supra note 23, at 70.
30. Fishman, supra note 19, at 46 & n. 187 (explaining that the poem had been cen-
sored as anti-clerical for nearly two hundred years, but publication was permitted in 1547 as
"An Act for the Repeal of Certain Statutes Concerning Treasons" (citing I Edw. 6, c. 12
(1547))).
31. Although it was only printed in 1550, there were many manuscript versions in
circulation before then. Sarah A. Kelen, Peirs Plouhman [sic] and the 'formidable array of
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be that Langland wrote in a manner easily accessible and ripe for copying
by those drafting statutes because he had "extensive knowledge of legal
theory and practice,"32 and there is some evidence that he was a legal scribe
and had legal training."
Other scholars, however, are skeptical that Parliament lifted the text
directly from the poem. Blake Bromley dismisses as romantic "the notion
that an epic religious poem inspired the Preamble's creation," and instead
argues that the Preamble is a reflection of the Elizabethan state's agenda for
charitable giving.34 He demonstrates that the same list of purposes enume-
rated in the Preamble can be found in the titles of various Tudor statutes
passed around the same time and that the lists in the Preamble and the poem
are not identical; "the absence of any reference to hospitals in the Preamble
is [conclusive] evidence that the Vision of Piers Plowman is not the Pream-
ble's source."35 Observing the similarities between the two sources, Profes-
sors Keeton and Sheridan infer that:
[This] fourteenth-century poem strikingly anticipates the language of the definition
contained in the statute of 1601, and it would therefore seem, not that the framers
of the statute consciously borrowed from Piers Plowman, but that the essential
elements of the definition were already well-established and were generally known
so early as the fourteenth century. 3 6
In fact, according to Langland scholar Joseph Wittig, "Piers Plowman has
had an enthusiastic audience from the time it was written," probably not for
literary reasons but because it "celebrat[ed] long-cherished ideals."37 It was
issued three times in the first year it was printed.38 That the poem was likely
written in a western dialect,39 somewhat different from the English used by
the Courts when the Preamble was drafted, also makes it unlikely that the
Preamble was copied from the poem. Still, the poem and the Preamble are
awfully similar.
Regardless of whether the poem was reproduced in the statute or the
content of the poem independently percolated through sixteenth century
blackletter" in the Early Nineteenth Century, in ILLUMINATING LETTERS: TYPOGRAPHY AND
LITERARY INTERPRETATION 47, 49 (Paul C. Gutjahr & Megan L. Benton eds., 2001).
32. PEARSALL, supra note 24, at 11.
33. Id. at 19.
34. Blake Bromley, 1601 Preamble: The State's Agenda for Charity, 7 CHARITY L.
& PRAC. REV. 177 (2002), available at http://www.beneficgroup.com/pdf/The%
20State's%20Agenda%2Ofor/20Charity.pdf.
35. Id.
36. L. A. SHERIDAN & GEORGE W. KEETON, THE MODERN LAW OF CHARITIES 4 (3D
ED. 1983).
37. JOSEPH S. WITrIG, WLLIAM LANGLAND REvISITED vii (1997).
38. Kelen, supra note 31, at 49.
39. Id. at 47 n.2 (explaining that none of the surviving manuscripts provides disposi-
tive evidence regarding the dialect, but that it was likely a southwest Worcestershire dialect).
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society, the similarities suggest some observations about nonprofit law and
narrative. First, law and literature count the same human endeavors as pur-
suing good. Maybe this isn't so surprising. After all, one could trace a
great deal of the secular law straight to the Bible. Even so, the literary
structure in the Preamble is striking, as is the fact that poetry advising the
reader on how to get into heaven found its way into statute.4
Second, the law that uses the same language as the poem, the Statute
of Elizabeth, is a law of great consequence. It outlined which organization-
al purposes were granted:
(1) the [substantial] privilege of indefinite existence; (2) the privilege of being va-
lid, even if the gift was in such general terms that it would be void for uncertainty
if for non-charitable purposes ... ; and (3) the privilege of obtaining fresh objects,
if those laid down by the founder were, either initially or subsequently, incapable
of execution .... 41
Third, although statute drafters are not usually poets, or certainly not poets
of Langland's stature, the Preamble is good reading.
B. English and American Charities Law
The observations regarding the similarity between the Statute of Eliz-
abeth and Piers Plowman are not only of historical interest. It may be true
that sixteenth century lawmakers were better poets or, at least, knew their
poetry better than our lawmakers. But the Preamble has been valid law for
centuries; indeed, some contemporary judges use it,42 and charities scholars
debate it even today. The poetic language has remained compelling to
judges, lawyers, and scholars alike.
The Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth was legally binding for Eng-
lish charities until quite recently. When the statute was repealed in 1888,
the Preamble was explicitly preserved.43 And, although the Charities Act of
40. See generally White, supra note 4 (discussing the connection between legal texts
and other narrative material).
41. KEETON & SHERIDAN, supra note 36, at 1.
42. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
43. See Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 42 (Eng.) (re-
pealing the Statute of Elizabeth). Although the schedule of Acts Repealed indicates that,
regarding the Statute of Elizabeth, "The whole Act" is to be repealed, Section 13(2) pre-
serves the Preamble. Id. It reads,
Whereas by the preamble to the Act of the forty-third year of Elizabeth, chapter
four (being one of the enactments hereby repealed), it is recited as follows:
... [the act then recites the Preamble] . . . and whereas in divers enactments
and documents reference is made to charities within the meaning, purview, and in-
terpretation of the said Act:
Be it therefore enacted that references to such charities shall be construed as




1960 "repealed the law of mortmain: the Act of 1888, and hence the provi-
sion therein which preserved the preamble,"" it redefined charity with ref-
erence to sources outside of the act,45 presumably including the case law
which continued to rely on the Preamble.46 It was not until only a few years
ago when things really changed. The Charities Act of 2006 amended Eng-
lish charities law by expanding the categories of charity and imposing the
requirement that charities advance a public benefit.47 So maybe, after four
centuries, the Preamble, if not dead, is resting.
The Preamble has also had tremendous influence on American chari-
ties law. The Statute of Elizabeth has been explicitly invoked throughout
the history of American charities law. Many of the same charitable purpos-
es contemplated by English law were imported into colonial law.48 Not all
states, however, directly imported English statutes. Following the Ameri-
can Revolution, some states repealed all English statutes, including the Sta-
tute of Charitable Uses and its Preamble.49 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that, in those states, the chancery courts did not hold equitable powers
over charitable dispositions because such powers derived from the Statute
of Elizabeth; this view, however, subsequently came to be seen as mista-
Id.; see also Pemsel v. Comm'rs of Income Tax, (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 296.
44. WARBURTON, supra note 28, at 3.
45. See Charities Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 58, § 38(4) (Eng.) ("Any reference in
any enactment or document to a charity within the meaning, purview and interpretation of
the Charitable Uses Act 1601, or of the preamble to it, shall be construed as a reference to a
charity within the meaning which the word bears as a legal term according to the law of
England and Wales.").
46. JONES, supra note 26, at 133 n.4. See also McGovern v. A-G, [1982] Ch. 321,
331 ("[T]he law requires a number of conditions to be fulfilled before trusts can be accepted
as being charitable. The general rule is that in order to achieve charitable status a trust, how-
ever philanthropic, must satisfy each of the following three requirements. (1) It must be of a
charitable nature, within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the Charitable Uses Act
1601 ... as interpreted by the courts and extended by statute," as well as other requirements.)
(emphasis added).
47. Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, §2(l)(b) (Eng.). Guidance regarding the definition of
public benefit can be found at www.charity-commission.gov.uk. According to the American
Law Institute's Principles of Nonprofit Organizations, "Just over 400 years later, the Chari-
ties Act 2006 became law. (The Charities Act applies in England and Wales; Scotland's
2005 version differs slightly, and Northern Ireland's law is still being drafted.) The Charities
Act expands the categories of purposes that qualify as charity, requires charities to prove
how they benefit the public, and increases the Charity Commission's role in compliance and
enforcement." American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, pt.
II, ch. 1, at 17 (Prelimary Draft No. 5, Feb. 2009).
48. See Irvin G. Wyllie, The Search for an American Law of Charity, 1776-1844, 46
Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 203, 204 (1959).
49. Id. at 219-21.
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ken.so Even in those states that rejected English statutes, the purposes enu-
merated in the Preamble provided some guidance for colonial law.
Although not an exhaustive review, consider the following examples
of the prominence of the Preamble in American legal argument and law. In
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Supreme Court declared
that Dartmouth was a private corporation, established by a charter that
formed a contract with the government, and that, therefore, the governor
could not determine its board membership without violating the contract.'
Arguing for the trustees, Daniel Webster invoked the Statute of Elizabeth to
demonstrate that the college's "laudable and charitable design of spreading
[C]hristian knowledge among the savages of our American wilderness,"
was a proper eleemosynary purpose and, therefore Dartmouth was an elee-
mosynary corporation, a species of private corporation.52 He said:
Eleemosynary corporations are for the management of private property, according
to the will of the donors. They are private corporations. A college is as much a
private corporation as a hospital; especially a college founded as this was, by pri-
vate bounty. A college is a charity. "The establishment of learning," says Lord
Hardwicke, "is a charity, and so considered in the statute of Elizabeth. A devise to
a college, for their benefit, is a laudable charity, and deserves encouragement."
The legal signication of a charity is derived chiefly from the statute 43 Eliz., c. 4.
"Those purposes," says Sir. W. Grant, "are considered charitable which that statute
enumerates." Colleges are enumerated as charities in that statute.53
American courts have frequently cited the statute to identify the range of
purposes typically identified as charitable. In the 1838 Case of The Medical
College of Philadelphia, the counsel for the college relied on the Preamble
as evidence that the medical college was a Pennsylvania charity.54 In 1839,
the New York Chancery Court noted "that bequests to charity, not within
the enumeration of the Statute of Elizabeth, have been since, though rarely
sustained," and, rather repetitively, that the statute "has been adopted as
defining what are to be regarded as charitable objects which this court will
protect. It is an enumeration of those objects which are to be deemed chari-
ties. It has been taken as a specification of what are charitable uses . . . .""
50. See id. at 208-09; Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
1,9,29 (1819).
51. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 550 (1819).
52. Id. at 524.
53. Id. at 563 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
54. Case of "The Med. Coll. of Phila.," 3 Whart. 445, 451-53 (Pa. 1838).
55. Wright v. Trs. of the Corp. of Methodist Episcopal Church in N.Y., 1 Hoff. Ch.




American courts also occasionally noted that they were not con-
strained by the list,"6 but the protests sometimes rung hollow. In a 1941
decision regarding the appropriateness of a Board of Tax Appeals disallow-
ance of a deduction from the estate tax for a bequest to a temperance board,
Judge Clark of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refrained from "[a]ny
extended discussion of the Statute of Elizabeth and the incorporation of ...
its preamble in English and American law," to avoid being "pedantic."" He
protested that "any emanation from Elizabethan days cannot be currently
conclusive."" Yet he then went on to cite the entire Preamble and, ultimate-
ly, relied on scholarly views on the appropriate scope of extensions to the
statute as a suitable basis for interpreting the 1926 Internal Revenue Code."
A few years later, a dissenting Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio
reminded the majority:
Our modem concept of what is or is not a charitable purpose is based upon the
enumeration of charitable purposes in the preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth, 43
Elizabeth, Chapter 4, commonly known as the Statute of Charitable Uses adopted
by Parliament in 1601. One of the charitable purposes therein enumerated was the
"maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners."60
The influence of the Preamble on American law continues to this day. In its
February 2009 draft document on charitable purposes, the American Law
Institute introduces the subject by explaining that, while the definition of
permissible charitable purposes is evolving, "[c]haritable organizations are
defined under a common law tradition that traces back to the Statutes of
Elizabeth in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries."6 ' The link is made
explicitly since "[t]he list of charitable purposes set forth in subsection (a)
traces back to the famous preamble in the Statute of Charitable Uses."62
What counts as an acceptable charitable purpose today differs by state,
but state law and commentators frequently look to the federal income tax
code for their definition. Section 501 (c)(3) defines public charities as:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, lite-
rary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic fa-
cilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
56. See, e.g., Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 375 (1854) ("We are neither depen-
dent upon the Stat. 43 Eliz., or the common law prerogative, to sustain such a charity." (cit-
ing 2 How. 195)).
57. Girard Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 122 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1941).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 112-14.
60. Beerman Found. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 87 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ohio 1949) (Taft,
J., dissenting).
61. American Law Institute, supra note 47, at 4.
62. Id. at 17.
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part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office. 3
This list is not reproduced from either Langland or the Preamble. We no
longer enumerate marrying off maidens as a good work (although caring for
destitute single mothers does count) and many organizations with purposes
that fall outside of either Piers's vision or the Preamble to the Statute of
Elizabeth receive federal tax exemption (for example, amateur athletic
groups that do not provide facilities). But the Preamble does come into
play.
For example, a great deal of effort goes into defining the term "charit-
able" in the tax code (and, as mentioned above, elsewhere). The definition
of "charity" is legal," and its meaning is not based on a contemporary, pop-
ular understanding of charity as consisting of gifts to impoverished benefi-
ciaries. But neither does its legal meaning come from statute. In fact, the
Service does not itself define charity in nonprofit regulation. It refers to the
common law," which is deeply informed by the Preamble.
In addition to providing legal content, attention to the Preamble can
aid contemporary legal interpretation. Trying to define "charity" is chal-
lenging in part because the meaning of language changes over time (a prob-
lem that Professor Sanford Levinson identified as both a subject of literary
criticism and a problem for constitutional interpretation).66 Meanings
change over the short term, but they change considerably over a period of
400 years, and this evolution makes interpretation hard. Yet, in our struggle
to interpret words, the Preamble still offers help. For example, in a policy
debate about a seemingly unrelated and utterly contemporary problem in
health policy-whether nonprofit hospitals merit their federal tax exemp-
63. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
64. Even before the establishment of tax exemption for U.S. charities, Joseph Wil-
lard helpfully explained the difference between the common and legal definitions of charity:
While. . . the law of charities had its main roots in the religious notions of the me-
dieval period, it would be a mistake to look exclusively to the religious or moral
side of charity for the origin of our law. "Undoubtedly," says a distinguished jurist
[J. Dwight], "in one sense charity may be defined to be all the good affections
which men ought to bear to each other; but, before the matter becomes the subject
of legal cognizance as a charity, there must be a gift to a general public use. This
may in some cases embrace the rich as well as the poor."
Willard, supra note 23, at 71 (citation omitted).
65. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113.
66. See generally Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982).
Unlike Levinson's point, mine is rather blunt. I am not demonstrating either that language is
indeterminate or that such indeterminacy generates uncertainty for the law. I only wish to
say that the Preamble is a source that can help reduce indeterminacy.
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tions-I discussed the Preamble, Piers Plowman, and changing meaning of
the term "mysese" and whether it meant sick specifically in terms of health
or more generally in terms of misery and suffering." A contemporary chari-
ties scholar remarked that "[v]iewing the ... categories [accepted as charit-
able] as substantially the totality of the concept of charitable, there is a
striking similarity between the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses
enacted in 1601 and the Department of the Treasury regulation under IRC §
501(c)(3)."" So maybe Langland has had a hand in drafting our laws as
well.
II. NONPROFIT LAW IN LITERATURE: ST. CROSS HOSPITAL AND THE
WARDEN
Nonprofit law is not only concerned with judging whether organiza-
tional purposes qualify as charitable. It also polices existing charities and
their fiduciaries for abuses, particularly the diversion of charitable assets
from their intended uses. Although the purposes listed in the Preamble have
attracted most observers' attention to the statute over the past 400 years, the
statute was designed to prevent the misuse of existing charitable assets.69
As recent press reports suggest, abuses of charitable assets did not end
in 1601. The New Yorker recently published "Rich Bitch," an article about
Leona Helmsley's charitable bequests."o The piece focuses on the eight
billion dollar bequest to a trust for "'purposes related to the provision of
care for dogs,"' but also discussed the more general legal issues related to
bequest to pets." There have been many other stories in the popular press.
Did ACORN inappropriately engage in electoral activities and voter regis-
tration fraud? Remember William Aramony and his girlfriend living the
high-life on the United Way's tab? How about the foundations associated
with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac excessive lobbying against regulations
that would apply to the mortgage lenders? And what of the Mormon
67. Jill Horwitz, Perspective: Nonprofit Ownership, Private Property, and Public
Accountability, 25 HEALTH AFF. W308, W309, W311 n.4 (2006) ("However, the 'meson-
dieux' referred to in the poem might be better understood as almshouses than anything like
contemporary hospitals. The Middle English Dictionary explains that 'mysese,' the word
translated as 'sick,' meant something like 'wretched' or 'miserable' in the fourteenth cen-
tury.").
68. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 180 (9th ed.
2007).
69. Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601) (Eng.).
70. Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch: The Legal Battle Over Trust Funds for Pets, NEW
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Church's work opposing California Proposition 8?" Or those ministers
politicking from the pulpit during the 2004 Presidential election?"
Just as these scandals fascinate us now, the major charities scandals of
the nineteenth century similarly captured the public imagination. They even
found their way into popular fiction. Charles Dickens offered a thinly
veiled account of the misuse of funds at the Cathedral Grammar School at
Rochester in Household Words.74 He identified as "serious mischief . .. an
unaccountable increase in the incomes of the Dean and Chapter, and a most
extraordinary stagnation and stand-still in the funds allotted to the scho-
lars."" Here I focus on another major scandal from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury involving fiduciary breaches at an ecclesiastical institution, a scandal
involving St. Cross Hospital near Winchester. (The almshouse, purportedly
"England's oldest continuing almshouse," still exists as a registered chari-
ty). 76
The St. Cross Hospital scandal provided a gripping plot for Anthony
Trollope's The Warden," the first of Trollope's Barsetshire novels, and to a
somewhat lesser extent, Barchester Towers. Like those in Rochester, St.
Cross Hospital's difficulties were widely publicized. Keats found St. Cross
"'a very interesting old place, both for its gothic tower and alms-square and
for the appropriation of its rich rents to a relation of the Bishop of Winches-
ter,"' noting that it was "'a charity greatly abused. '"7 The widespread ap-
preciation of actual and fictional narratives regarding charities scandals over
the past several centuries presupposes a fairly rich idea about how nonprof-
its should and are required to operate.
Trollope refers to St. Cross explicitly in the novel." At the beginning
of Chapter Two, he describes St. Cross to set the context of public agitation
72. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of
Charities, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 370 (2009).
73. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Citing Falwell's Endorsement of Bush, Group
Challenges His Tax-Exempt Status, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at Al.
74. Charles Dickens, The History of a Certain Grammar-School, 3 HOUSEHOLD
WORDS, Aug. 9, 1851, at 457.
75. Id. at 460.
76. The Hospital of St. Cross, http://www.stcross.f2s.com/ (last visited May 20,
2010).
77. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN (Michael Sadleir & Frederick Page eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1855) [hereinafter TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN].
78. See ROBERT BERNARD MARTIN, ENTER RUMOUR: FOUR EARLY VICTORIAN
SCANDALS 138 (1962) (quoting Keats).
79. Trollope does not refer explicitly to St. Cross where he discusses The Warden in
his autobiography but, instead, writes generally about scandals in which charitable funds
made their way to Church officials. He notes, "There had been more than one such case
brought to public notice at the time, in which there seemed to have been an egregious mal-
versation of charitable purposes." ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 81 (Dodd,
Mead & Company 1912) (1883) [hereinafter TROLLOPE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY].
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regarding impermissible uses of charitable funds: "The well-known case of
the Hospital of St. Cross has even come before the law courts of the coun-
try, and the struggles of Mr. Whiston, at Rochester, have met with sympathy
and support. Men are beginning to say that these things must be looked
into."" Although at least one scholar finds it "strange that [Trollope's]
commentators have paid so much attention to St. Cross and none at all ...
to Rochester,"" the St. Cross case facts are strikingly similar to those in The
Warden and, beyond the general wrong of diverting charitable funds, not
much at all like those at Rochester.
A. St. Cross Hospital
The history of St. Cross is long and complicated. Since detailed ac-
counts are provided elsewhere," I'll summarize only the relevant facts here,
reporting mainly from Robert Martin's chapter on St. Cross in his history,
Enter Rumour: Four Early Victorian Scandals." The St. Cross scandal,
was a source of growing public frustration at the self-interested and wide-
spread practices of the church. It centered on Reverend Francis North
whose father, the Bishop of Winchester, "collated him to the Mastership of
St. Cross Hospital, Winchester," the last of multiple and lucrative positions
he had assigned to his son." In appointing his son, the Bishop was merely
continuing a long tradition of nepotism. He himself had been granted one
of the most lucrative of all ecclesiastical positions in England in 1781 by
King George III through the maneuverings of his brother, the Prime Minis-
ter and later the Earl of Guilford." Unfortunately for Reverend North, the
public was soon to lose patience with such practices.
St. Cross Hospital was founded in the twelfth century by Henry de
Blois, the grandson of William the Conqueror, to:
provid[e] for "thirteen poor impotent men and so reduced in strength as rarely or
never to be able to support themselves without the assistance of another." They
were to be given food, clothing, and lodging, and besides these, one hundred "other
poor men of good conduct, and of the more indigent" were to receive free din-
ners.86
80. TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN, supra note 77, at 10.
81. G.F.A. Best, The Road to Hiram's Hospital: A Byway of Early Victorian Histo-
ry, 5 VICTORIAN STUD. 135, 144 (1961).
82. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 78; James J. Fishman, Charity Scandals as a
Catalyst of Legal Change and Literary Imagination in Nineteenth Century England, 2005
MICH. ST. L. REV. 369 (2005).
83. MARTIN, supra note 78.
84. Id. at 154.
85. Id. at 138, 142-43.
86. Id. at 157.
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During its early history, it was administered by the Hospitallers of St. John,
but "passed under the direct supervision of the Bishop of Winchester in
1303."8 By the seventeenth century it was claimed that the original govern-
ing documents were lost. Thereafter hospital operations were guided by a
document known as the Consuetudinarium, which included the provisions
allowing the master to benefit from profits related to the leases of lands."
Additional purposes were added to the foundation over the years, including
provisions for supporting "men of gentle birth who were reduced in the
world.""
Over time, as the property holdings had grown increasingly valuable,
the Master's revenue share, compared to the brothers' share,"o grew consi-
derably. This was not only because the brothers' share was identified as a
fixed sum, but also because the Master used a system of leasing on fines,
such that in exchange for a single large sum he leased the lands for a low
rent over multiple generations.
The fines became the property of the Master, with a deduction of 2d. in the pound
for each Brother and 6d. for the Chaplain; this deducted sum was added to the rela-
tively small annual rent roll and applied against the running of the Hospital, so, al-
though it appears at first to have come out of the Master's pocket, it actually was a
purely paper deduction from his income. The fine system meant that for years in
advance the property and its fair income were alienated from the Hospital for the
sake of immediate cash.9'
Reverend North's unusual appointment as lay, rather than spiritual,
Master exacerbated the inequity. It allowed him to earn the fines in ex-
change for signing the leases while leaving the Steward to manage the hos-
87. Id. at 157-58.
88. The precise purposes of the original charity are not known, possibly because the
hospital statutes were lost. "By 1696 quarrels between the Master and the Brethren led to the
drawing up of a Consuetudinarium, or Customary, which recorded the prevailing practices of
the Hospital and those within the memory of the oldest members." Id. at 158. This docu-
ment, which was submitted "to the Bishop, as Visitor, for ratification as a guide to future
conduct of the charity," included provisions directing "that the Master is to receive all profits
and revenues, out of which he is to bear the whole charges of the establishment, and that, if
there is any surplus, he has the right to retain it himself." Id. at 158-59. In addition, the
Master was to control the leases, had rights to the personal estates of the Brothers who died
in the hospital, and powers "to appoint the Chaplain and Steward of the Hospital"; each
brother was to receive "2d. in the pound on the amount paid for the renewal" of each lease
and the Master was to receive the rest for his personal use. Id. at 159.
89. Id. at 158.
90. Although the inmates were known as the "brothers of St. Cross," they were not
monks. The Hospital of St. Cross, History, http://www.stcross.f2s.com/history (last visited
May 20, 2010). Brothers still live in and manage the hospital. See The Hospital of St. Cross,
Becoming a Brother, http://www.stcross.f2s.com/becomeabrother.htm (last visited May 20,
2010). Applicants must be over sixty years old and no longer employed. Id. For application
forms, see id.
91. MARTIN, supra note 78, at 159.
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pital and the Chaplain to perform the religious duties for the hospital and the
Parish.92 (The fictional character in The Warden held both offices). Appar-
ently Reverend North was a generous and caring Master. He provided extra
services for the Brethren from his own funds and raised the stipends of the
Brethren, Steward, and Chaplain.93 When Reverend North became the Earl
of Guilford in 1827 (the title passed from his uncle, the Prime Minister, and
his cousins first), he resigned several of his many benefices, but not the
Mastership of St. Cross.94
Over time, public attention turned to the large disparity between the
funds going to Reverend North and those going to charity (to the Brethren
and to other poor citizens whose tithes largely went to the Earl). The papers
also took note of the corrupt fine system." At a legislator's urging, the
Queen ordered her attorney general to initiate an investigation of the chari-
ty, during the course of which the original governing documents were
found, most of them in the Hospital.96 After lengthy proceedings in which
Lord Guilford defended himself on the grounds that he followed the terms
of the Consuetudinarium, the Master of Rolls found for the Attorney Gener-
al." Despite its victory in court, the fate of St. Cross was grim. The Hos-
pital was placed into receivership and run by a fifteen-member trusteeship.98
Although its remaining assets were protected from theft, the most valuable
assets had to be sold off, leaving the Hospital quite poor by the time the
receivership was lifted in 1861.
B. The Warden
The legal problems at the center of The Warden-diversion of charita-
ble assets and the dead hand-are the same as those at the center of the St.
Cross scandal. The story centers on a well-intentioned and mild clergyman,
Reverend Septimus Harding, the warden of the almshouse called Hiram's
Hospital. Hiram's Hospital is just like St. Cross. It was established by John
Hiram's will in 1434 and houses twelve elderly, destitute former laborers
92. Id. at 160.
93. Id. at 162.
94. Id. at 164.
95. Id. at 166 (citing an article in the GLOBE printed October 21, 1843 that was a
reprint of an article from the HANTS INDEPENDENT) ("'By the mode of management now
existing in St. Cross Hospital, it will be thus seen that a property belonging to it, and worth
two thousand pounds a year, is comparatively valueless to the charity, and totally diverted
from the purposes of the donors of the property-the relief and maintenance of the poor and
destitute."').
96. Id. at 168-70.
97. Id. at 172.
98. Id. at 173. In addition, "[l]eases were to be signed for no more than twenty-one
years and without fines. The Master was to receive a salary of £250 and was required" to
perform religious services. Id.
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known as bedesmen. The action starts with the discovery by Mr. John
Bold-an arrogant and impulsive young surgeon as well as the suitor of
Harding's youngest daughter-that the Warden has been earning an annual
income of £800 while the inmates receive only one shilling six pence per
day.99 This seemingly inequitable state of affairs had come about because
Hiram's will specified that the bedesmen were to earn a fixed amount (six
pence per day) while, at least according to some participants in the drama,
the Warden's income was to come from current rents on the estate. 00 Hi-
ram and his lawyers had obviously considered neither inflation nor the ap-
preciation of property values. (The bedesmen earned a little more than the
will specified because the local church authorities authorized a small ad-
justment and because Harding, like his real life counterpart, supplemented
their income from his personal funds). Bold, certain that the inequitable
payments violated the terms of the charitable trust, convinced some of the
bedesmen they were entitled to 100 pounds per year. The rest of the story
traces Bold's case, pursued in court and the newspapers, and its grim conse-
quences for all the parties concerned.
Although Trollope found the plot in contemporary news stories and
used it with few changes, The Warden is really a fictional account about a
legal doctrine rather than a particular legal conflict. Surprisingly, even if
the reader knows nothing about the historical setting or about the laws go-
verning estates or charities, it is also a good story. Although not blockbus-
ters, The Warden and its sequel, Barchester Towers, sold moderately well
over a long period.o' In fact, The Warden caught the public's attention and
contributed to Trollope's reputation as a major novelist.02
Harding's struggle is not merely the story of a personal struggle set
against the backdrop of a charity scandal. Although the novel is commonly
understood as a story about church corruption and the resulting drive for
reform, I think this characterization does not fully capture the story.o3 The
story is not merely about the church as a church. Had Hiram's bequest been
for the use of the church itself the story could have focused on corruption,
but it would have been a different tale. That the wrongdoers are men of the
cloth makes it a juicier and more timely story for the 1850s than if the or-
ganization had been secular-but the misuse of funds is misuse because of
the legal obligations that flowed with them as charitable assets, not because
99. TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN, supra note 77, at 13-16, 41.
100. Id. at 3, 4.
101. TROLLOPE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 79, at 94 ("[The two novels] together
have given me almost every year some small income. I get the accounts very regularly, and I
find that I have received £727 11s. 3d. for the two. It is more than I got for the three or four
works that came afterwards, but the payments have been spread over twenty years.").
102. RAFAEL HELLING, A CENTURY OF TROLLOPE CRITicisM 33 (1956).
103. See, e.g., id. at 75, 78 (citing the criticism of The Warden and Barchester Towers
in The Times in 1857 about the books as a treatment of the clergy).
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it was clergymen who were using them incorrectly. Nor do I think Henry
James's claim that The Warden "is simply the history of an old man's con-
science"'" fully captures the story. The source of Harding's troubled con-
science is not whether he is being good, but whether he is being faithful to
Hiram's wishes as expressed, imperfectly, in the will. This is why I think
that the legal story of the nonprofit organization-Hiram's hospital-is the
nut of the thing.'o
Moreover, the parties, their spoils, and their roles in the legal system
form the novel's structure. The hospital, the plaintiff, the defendants, and
the press (which really raised the stakes) each get separate chapters that
detail their roles in the conflict and their legal and public relations maneu-
verings. What we know about the characters frequently comes from what
the characters believe about the law. Trollope's picture of the gluttonous
Archdeacon Grantly (the Bishop's son and Harding's father-in-law) and his
family comes not only from the detailed portrait of the riches in their home
and the weight of the food on their table, but also from Grantly's belief that
the church's wealth rightly flows to him, his family, and his friends. We
know that Harding is a kind, principled, and somewhat befuddled man only
in part because of his love for his daughters and his generosity with the hos-
pital's inmates. We learn about his character most clearly, however, from
his struggle to do what is right according to the law, even if it has disastrous
consequences for him and the inmates about whom he cares a great deal.
I don't think the Trollope's subtly drawn picture of the law is merely
an unintended consequence of his particular efforts to create characters who
are recognizably human rather than, as he terms it, "puppets."'0 6 I think it is
because the law, like Trollope's characters, is subtly drawn. So not only
does literature explain nonprofit law, but law illuminates literature. Trol-
lope is a novelist first and foremost, and his characters are not there to make
points or as stand-ins for legal arguments."' This is why Trollope's use of
the law is so successful. It adds depth to portraits of the fictional characters.
Through the story we learn about the logic and limits of charities law,
particularly the difficulty of honoring the dead hand and the costs of doing
so. The legal struggle in The Warden does not easily admit of heroes and
104. Id. at 99 (quoting HENRY JAMES, PARTIAL PORTRAITS 113 (London, MacMIllian
& Sons 1899) in a chapter on contemporary criticism of Trollope's novels).
105. Well, maybe one nut. Martin thinks the St. Cross story is one of political
reform: "St. Cross was important because it was a dramatic setting of the meeting between
vested, traditional privileges and the modem urge to reform. . . ." MARTIN, supra note 78, at
13.
106. TROLLOPE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 79, at 215-16, 277.
107. As James Boyd White explains, "A literary text is not a string of propositions,
but a structured experience of the imagination ..... James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer
Learn from Literature? 102 HARV. L. REv. 2014, 2016 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)).
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villains. Trollope even makes a slightly sympathetic case for the church
when, in describing the St. Cross case, he notes the Church's claim that the
assets were being well-used by rewarding servants of Christianity. He is
dead-on regarding the law when his narrator implies that it doesn't matter
whether the Church is using the funds for good purposes, a questionable
proposition in any event. If those purposes aren't in accord with the found-
er's wishes as expressed in the will, the Church must either comply or apply
to the court for help in changing the purposes. In fact, according to the nar-
rator, "it is asserted that Henry de Blois, founder of St. Cross, was not great-
ly interested in the welfare of the reformed church."' The reader learns
that the crux of the battle between the Church and the reformers is about
which side better represents the founder's intent.
This charities law story bears no resemblance to Professor Kuyken-
dall's description of business law stories:
Business movies explore themes about money, greed, sex, the pace and excitement
of velocity in trading, fathers and sons, and modem gadgetry, but they virtually
never present a coherent narrative of corporate financial logic or point to a conclu-
sion about business, except at the highest level of generality about the emptiness of
modem organizational culture.' 0 9
Much to the contrary in The Warden. The law is the backbone of the narra-
tive structure. The dramatic tension centers on the law's requirement that
the charity pursue the Hospital's purpose as intended by Hiram, the difficul-
ty of showing fidelity to charitable purposes over time, the legal mechan-
isms for ensuring that it happens, and the ways in which innocent actors get
tripped up in the struggles. (Of course, the book also highlights that arcane
legal procedure prevents justice from being done, if one thinks that justice
would be enriching the elderly bedesmen at Harding's expense).o10
Further, and it might just be because of my professional interest, but I
find the most compelling writing in the novel to be the writing about the
case and Harding's struggle. The stories of Bold's romantic pursuit of Miss
Harding and her response, the Grantly family avarice, the struggle between
the senior and junior Grantlys, and other subplots provide amusement and
varying perspectives on the main action, but Harding's story is truly affect-
ing. The old man's efforts to adhere to the law cause him pain, including
physical pain during a feverish episode in London. They also cause the
bedesmen pain. Although we don't get to know the individual bedesmen
well, their portraits and the description of the harm that comes to them from
pursuing what may well be their legal entitlement as beneficiaries to Hi-
108. TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN, supra note 77, at 11.
109. Kuykendall, supra note 6, at 553.
110. David Luban has written about the tensions between legality and morality faced
by Trollope's characters in Orley Farm. See David Luban, A Midrash on Rabbi Shaffer and
Rabbi Trollope, 77 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 889 (2002).
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ram's will are haunting. Harding's journey highlights how complicated and
morally ambiguous the law of charities-a law that balances doing good
with fidelity to donors' wishes-can be. Not surprisingly, Harding, it turns
out, was one of the characters of whom Trollope was the proudest.'"
Perhaps, therefore, the strongest piece of evidence for the idea that
narrative techniques are useful in nonprofit law is that Trollope gets the
reader to see the difficulty and consequences of applying imprecise law to
complex and changing circumstances. He gets the reader to see this much
more acutely than legal texts and non-fiction commentary typically do. In
explaining why he wrote sympathetically about the clergymen rather than
characterizing them merely as inappropriate beneficiaries of the hospital's
assets, Trollope's narrative highlights the moral uncertainty that necessarily
inheres in even well-intentioned attempts to balance doing good and avoid-
ing doing violence to a donor's intent. He writes:
I had been struck by two opposite evils,-or what seemed to me to be evils ... I
thought that I might be able to expose them, or rather to describe them, both in one
and the same tale. The first evil was the possession by the Church of certain funds
and endowments which had been intended for charitable purposes, but which had
been allowed to become incomes for idle Church dignitaries. . . . The second evil
was its very opposite. Though I had been much struck by the injustice above de-
scribed, I had also often been angered by the undeserved severity of the newspa-
pers towards the recipients of such incomes, who could hardly be considered to be
the chief sinners in the matter. 112
Although he explains that when advocating a cause it is better to pick one
side or the other, his discussion of his choice to offer a more balanced por-
trait demonstrates the partiality of the law. As he explained:
It was open to me to have described a bloated parson, with a red nose and all other
iniquities, openly neglecting every duty required from him, and living riotously on
funds purloined from the poor,-defying as he did do so the moderate remon-
strances of a virtuous press. Or I might have painted a man as good, as sweet, and
as mild as my warden, who should also have been a hard-working, ill-paid minister
of God's word, and might have subjected him to the rancorous venom of some dai-
ly Jupiter, [the newspaper that attacked Harding,] who, without a leg to stand on,
without any true case, might have been induced, by personal spite, to tear to rags
the poor clergyman with poisonous, anonymous, and ferocious leading articles.
But neither of these programmes recommended itself to my honesty. 13
He concludes that he came to understand that he was not the man to balance
the two perspectives in one work.'14 But all evidence is to the contrary. The
resulting work is more subtle than Trollope admits in his self-evaluation.
S11l. TROLLOPE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 79, at 85, 96.
112. Id. at 81.
113. Id. at 82.
114. Id. at 83. In addition, Trollope concluded, "I have already said of the work that
it failed altogether in the purport for which it was intended." Id. at 85. But we don't have to
accept his views on the matter.
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There is no better portrayal of the costs of the dead hand than what
happens when the terms of Hiram's will are revived. Who can forget the
scene in which Harding says goodbye to Bell, the deaf, bedridden, and dy-
ing inmate grasping for his bounty? The avarice awakened in a dying Be-
desman by the prospect of reinstating the terms of Hiram's bequest is terri-
fying. As Trollope describes it,
[P]oor old Bell had nearly outlived all human feelings. "And your reverence," said
he, and then he paused, while his old palsied head shook horribly, and his shriveled
cheeks sank lower within his jaws, and his glazy eye gleamed with a momentary
light; "and your reverence, shall we get the hundred a year then?"'ts
Maybe the tangle of interests that arise in enforcing charitable purposes is
why judges have such extensive equitable powers to reform those purposes.
Maybe this area of law is of a sort where considering the two perspectives
in one work of fiction is the right way to go. And maybe this is precisely
why nonprofit law is so ripe for and suited to narrative techniques.
Finally, The Warden instructs readers in how the law works on the
ground. It demonstrates the critical choices an advocate encounters in fram-
ing his case. For example, The Warden shows how Bold's framing of the
case and the particular facts upon which he (and the media) focuses drive
the story. Not surprisingly, Bold is not concerned about a violation of the
terms of the bequest that is far more certain than the diversion of funds to
Reverend Harding. Hiram was a woolstapler and the support he left was
meant for twelve superannuated wool-carders. Since there were no longer
wool-carders in the area, other laborers benefited. Yet Bold did not seek
justice for wool-carders or reformation of the terms of the trust through a
cy-pres proceeding. The story that Bold constructs and the media picks up
is the story that guides the application of the law.
The Warden also demonstrates how non-legal actors affect the law in
action and, in doing so, illustrates the complex interrelationships between
law and other social institutions. Bold and the others engage in what may
seem like a purely legal battle to rectify the problem that money may not be
being distributed according to Hiram's specified purposes. But it is the pub-
licity by the tabloid papers that moves the case along. In fact, the legal pro-
fessionals drop out of the story altogether once the narrow legal issues that
interest them are resolved. As in the real world, therefore, the story doesn't
end on the doorstep of the court."' It ends with uncertainty about whether
Harding will be reassigned as the hospital warden that is not resolved until
115. TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN, supra note 77, at 276.
116. The "climactic courtroom face-offs" that one commonly sees on television are,




the end of the next novel in the Barsetshire series, Barchester Towers. This
leaves the reader, rather than the court, to judge the case.'"
Professor Coral Lansbury has noted the judicial role of the reader in
arguing that Trollope is a distinctly legal writer. In her book detailing the
transactions that form the basis for many of his novels, she builds the case
that his novels both take on a legal structure and are informed by legal rea-
soning:
Trollope is essentially a judicial writer in his willingness to hear all opinions
and then let the final decision rest with the reader. One phrase is repeated through-
out the novels: "The reader must judge for himself" This requires more than a
passive acceptance of the narrator's interpretation of events: it calls for the active
participation of the reader in the elucidation of character and the moral verdict to
be reached." 8
Perhaps this observation does not go far enough. Trollope is not only a le-
gal writer in his ability to demonstrate two sides of a conflict, he is a legal
writer in his ability to communicate the complexities of nonprofit law more
generally.
CONCLUSION
This brings me back to the beginning. What is the right response to
students who want to "work for a nonprofit" or specialize in nonprofit law?
Some gentle ribbing is in order. At some level they are being sloppy, and
their comments provide a useful opportunity to remind them that the terms
they use have distinct technical and popular meanings, even if those mean-
ings develop in reference to each other. But when they speak in shorthand
about nonprofits they are speaking with more accuracy than this description
credits them. The law itself struggles to define the term "nonprofit," and
"doing something for the public good" isn't a terrible way to understand at
least part of the legal description of nonprofits.
Maybe the students' understanding of the term nonprofit comes from
the narratives about nonprofit law. Not only fiction, but the law itself tells
colorful stories about the nonprofit employees, fiduciaries, and nonprofit
organizations. These stories fill in a body of law that some have described
as impossibly vague. And the law gives readers a way to understand what
motivates literary characters, just as those characters' beliefs about the law
tells readers a great deal about the characters themselves. Moreover, as I
hope I've demonstrated here, parts of it read like poetry because it very well
may be poetry. Finally, because important human stories and dramas are at
117. I am grateful to Jim White for bringing this to my attention.
118. CORAL LANSBURY, THE REASONABLE MAN: TROLLOPE'S LEGAL FIcTION 224
(1981).
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the heart of charities law, stories about how to be good and faithful at the
same time, nonprofit law makes for a compelling source of fiction.
